The country is entering the final stretch toward the 2027 general election with its constitutional promise under sustained pressure. Across the past year, citizens have continued to protest over state crime, economic hardship, and failures of governance, while the state has too often responded with brute force, surveillance, arrests and restrictions on civic space. This is not only the assessment of Kenyan civil society.
Freedom House downgraded Kenya’s global freedom score from 51 to 49 out of 100 in 2026 and continues to classify the country as “partly free”. It scored freedom of assembly at just 1 out of 4 and due process and protection from illegitimate physical force at 1 out of 4.[1] Similarly, CIVICUS said Kenya is “repressed”, the second-worst rating.[2] Amnesty International has described Kenya’s human rights situation as having deteriorated significantly, citing unlawful and lethal force during demonstrations, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, intimidation and surveillance of journalists and activists, media blackouts, threats to privacy and freedom of expression, and a deepening gender-based violence.[3] That pattern is dangerous ahead of 2027, and it borders on the crisis of “democratic backsliding”, which involves the substantial weakening of democratic practices in a shift toward authoritarianism.[4] The bleak and dire state of public affairs justifies this report’s title, and the authoritarian playbook exposed emerging tactics of regression across the nation.[5]
The findings of this report and the situation constitute an escalation from what we found in September 2025, when we published a cumulative third-year report since the Kenya Kwanza regime was sworn into office in September 2022. The report, titled “Ruto’s 3 years of violence, corruption and state capture”, sent worrying trends and signals that we were facing governance tempests.[6] This has been validated by other findings. The latest TIFA report indicates that most Kenyans believe the country is moving in the wrong direction. Dissatisfaction with the country’s direction has risen to 76 per cent in June 2026, the highest level recorded during the tracking period, up from 68 per cent in November 2025.[7]
Methodologically, this report is a content analysis of independent reports by international and national human rights organisations, as well as media reports, covering September 2025 and October 2026. We have highlighted references to cases predating September 2025 to show patterns and trends of violations. We issue this report in fulfilment of our civic obligations under Articles 1, 3 and 132 of the Constitution. These articles establish the sovereign power of the people, the duty to respect, uphold and defend the Constitution, and the President’s obligation to report to the public and Parliament on the state of the nation. The report also addresses the extent to which the obligations under Article 10 on national values and principles of governance, and the Republic’s international obligations, have been met. Unlike the president’s report, this is a people’s alternative, or shadow, report. It will be shared with the public, Parliament, and our transnational treaty bodies - from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to the United Nations Human Rights Council and its mandate holders.
As we approach 2027, it is critical to recognize the risk of gross and systemic violations and abuses, given the high stakes and competitive elections. According to the Kofi Annan Foundation’s June 2026 report, Kenya faces an 84.1 per cent risk of electoral-related violence.[8]
Electoral integrity and road to 2027
The by-elections during the reporting period offered an early test of whether the country is learning from the violence, intimidation and electoral abuses that have marred previous elections. Across four rounds of mini polls between November 2025 and July 2026, civil society organizations documented voter bribery, political violence, intimidation, destruction of property, misuse of public resources, partisan conduct by public officials, and interference with journalists.
The November 27, 2025, by-elections were the clearest warning. The polls covered the Baringo Senate seat, six National Assembly constituencies, including Banissa, Kasipul, Magarini, Malava, Mbeere North and Ugunja, and the Kabuchai/Chwele ward.[9] The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) documented three deaths during the campaign period. Two people were killed in clashes in Kasipul, while a man aged over 70 died in a stampede in Kabuchai after a political rally was disrupted by hired goons. There were also recorded attacks on hotels and homes associated with candidates, which led to at least 10 people being hospitalised due to injuries sustained during the assault. Senior and middle-level government officials were actively involved in campaigns, raising concerns about political neutrality and the misuse of public office and state resources.[10]
It is disturbing that in Isiolo South, West Kabras, Muminji, and Evuroe, during the February 26, 2026, by-elections, 27.3 per cent of polling stations failed to publicly post results forms, which is a crucial accountability mechanism as guided by the Maina Kiai decision. Also, KIEMS kits failed in 30 per cent of the observed stations, yet the country is banking on this technology in the next polls.[11] Violence also erupted during the campaigns for the Emurua Dikirr MP seat, when at least three people were injured after supporters of UDA and the Democratic for Citizens Party clashed.[12]
The July 16, 2026, Ol Kalou parliamentary by-election was the most serious electoral warning of the year, as it was marred by voter bribery and inducement, destruction of property, violence and intimidation, including the loss of one life. Goons wreaked havoc, and in numerous instances, police, mostly in civilian clothes, operated with impunity, ran roughshod, attacked journalists and shot in the air during the polling day. This state-led violence had spread into the neighbouring Gilgil constituency ahead of the vote. State resources were seriously misused by senior government officials, including the Deputy President, Kithure Kindiki, and a host of Cabinet Secretaries, as they campaigned for the UDA candidate, who eventually lost.[13],[14]
Political violence and intolerance
Freedom House has already downgraded Kenya’s assessment of political pluralism and opposition space, citing the narrowing of political space.[15] Political actors increasingly turned to goons to disrupt political gatherings, leading to at least 11 killings so far this year.[16]In January 2026, goons disrupted a church service at St. Peter's ACK Witima in Othaya, attended by former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua and other political figures.[17] A month later, police fired tear gas at a Linda Mwananchi rally in Kitengela, abruptly ending the gathering, and in the ensuing melee, police shot to death A 28-year-old Vincent Ayomo Otieno.[18] Six days later, on February 21, political clashes between Linda Mwananchi and regime supporters in Vihiga and Kakamega again resulted in the death of George Olande Otobe and injuries to others.[19]
Political violence did not spare individual politicians. Vihiga Senator Godfrey Osotsi was in April 2026, assaulted by goons at a Kisumu restaurant, and police later claimed the perpetrators had fled the country.[20] It did not end there. On August 16, hundreds of goons armed with machetes, guns, and sticks attacked a convoy of vehicles transporting Linda Mwananchi supporters and politicians as they travelled to a political rally in Homa Bay town, killing at least three people.[21] Even political gatherings presided over by regime luminaries were hit. UDA delegates’ meeting at Nembure Stadium in Embu, presided over by Deputy President Kindiki Kithure, suffered violence that led to the shooting to death of Moses Munene and Mike Lewis.[22]
Police brutality and transnational repression
The regime also responded with brute force, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and restrictions when challenged over human rights abuses. In September 2025, the country woke up to the shocking news of the beating to death of 35-year-old trader Samson Wanda by prison officers in Kitale and the death of 26-year-old Simon Warui in a Mombasa police cell.[23] In October 2025, a 17-year-old student in Narok was beaten, chained and had acid poured on his legs while in police custody in an attempt to extract a confession. The student survived the horrific torture.[24] That month, UN special rapporteurs raised concerns about the regime’s arrests and arbitrary detention of Mark Amiani, Mulingwa Nzau, Francis Mutunge Mwangi and Boniface Mwangi in connection with the 2025 protests; the unlawful deportation of KHRC staff member Martin Mavenjina; and restrictions on media coverage of demonstrations.[25]
The Missing Voices 2025 Annual Report, released in March 2026, documented 131 cases of police violence in 2025. Of these, 125 were police killings and six enforced disappearances.[26] A year later, the trend had not changed. April 2026 marked the return of the police force during protests, with police arresting at least 11 people who were demanding the reduction of fuel prices.[27] The escalation became deadly a month later, when the Missing Voices recorded 24 police killings in May alone.[28] Police also injured over 30 people and arbitrarily arrested over 348 during protests triggered by record fuel prices.[29] Just recently, Shaban Bakari Shaban, 28, was abducted and has remained forcibly disappeared.[30]
The police's heavy-handedness and the regime’s misgovernance pushed many youth to the streets. Kenya Freedom Index recorded 453 protests in the first six months of 2026, a 29 per cent increase from the same period in 2025. Police dispersals during the first half of 2026 had already reached 77 per cent of the entire 2025 total, while arrests had reached 73 per cent of the 2025 total. Live ammunition remained the second-most frequently documented weapon used by police during protests, after teargas.[31]
On June 8, 2026, police used teargas to disperse a protest against development plans inside Nairobi National Park and arrested at least nine demonstrators, including former Chief Justice David Maraga.[32]
The second June 25 anniversary exposed the most serious pattern of state coercion during the reporting period. Before the demonstrations even began, police erected roadblocks around Nairobi and in several counties, preventing people from accessing workplaces, businesses, and essential services, and violating constitutional rights to movement, association, and peaceful assembly (the court later found Inspector-General of Police Douglas Kanja in contempt of a court order and pardoned him).[33] During the anniversary, KNCHR documented 361 arrests across 11 counties, including of 18 human rights defenders and two journalists. There were also seven cases of enforced disappearance - six human rights defenders arrested outside Parliament, and one within the CBD, were taken away in a police truck, not booked at any police station and days later found dumped along Langata and Ngong roads after being tortured.[34] But before the anniversary on June 24, officers from the Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) arbitrarily arrested political activist Bob Njagi on treason and incitement allegations, only for the court to close the case on July 2 because the DCI failed to prove it.[35] Columbia University’s Global Freedom of Expression Protest Monitor described the regime’s whole response as a “mass pre-emptive containment strategy”,[36] a warning shot ahead of the general election.
This year was also marked by transnational repression, another tactic within the regime’s security playbook, after the National Intelligence Service intercepted Brian Kagoro, the Africa director of the Open Society Foundations, at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, detained him for about 14 hours, and removed him from Kenya to South Africa without due process.[37] His attempt to return to Kenya in September, after the court ordered the state to allow him to do so, was blocked.[38] At the same time, Tanzanian human-rights defender, Mshabaha Mshabaha Hamza, was abducted and forcibly transported to Tanzania before being rescued,[39] deepening concerns about the regime’s failure to stop the country’s territory from continuing to be a playground for abduction and rendition of human rights defenders.
This trend started way before, if the cases of Kizza Besigye and Maria Sarungi are anything to go by. Besigye was abducted in Kenya in November 2024, renditioned to Uganda, tortured, faced trumped-up charges, and held in detention ever since, despite his health deteriorating. The regime admitted its involvement in Beigye’s rendition.[40] Two months later, in January, Sarungi, a critic of Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu, who had fled the country and sought refuge in Kenya, was abducted in Nairobi by armed men. She was assaulted, choked and intimidated before being abandoned several hours later.[41] The regional dimension became particularly troubling in May 2026, when Suluhu, speaking alongside President William Ruto in Dar es Salaam, called for Kenya and Tanzania to adopt a coordinated approach to “deal” with young people involved in political activism, and her remarks included phrases like “piga mikwaju”, commonly translated in this context as “whip” or “discipline.[42]
The comments are official confirmation of the existing transnational policy on repression. Already, Freedom House’s assessment of transnational repression concludes that Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan law enforcement and intelligence agencies are increasingly coordinating across borders to silence dissent. The development is a dangerous form of regional cooperation that can eliminate safe havens for activists and opposition figures.[43] CIVICUS similarly described the East and Horn of Africa as experiencing a growing pattern of cross-border abductions, renditions, judicial harassment and torture targeting critics. It is on this basis that it ranked Kenya as “repressed”, the second worst rating.[44]
Digital repression, pervasive surveillance and media freedom
The state violence was also evident through pervasive surveillance, when the regime planned to roll out a digital intelligence unit to monitor online activity amid growing digital repression that played a significant role in the targeting of Gen Z protesters.[45] New research by the Disruption Network Institute (DNI) and KHRC found that ubiquitous technical surveillance, enabled by the infrastructure of telecoms such as Safaricom, made it impossible for citizens, including human rights defenders and state critics, to opt out of state surveillance, with life-or-death consequences.[46] A positive development, though, occurred when the High Court declared unconstitutional provisions of the 2025 amendments that authorised the National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee to order the blocking of websites and applications without prior judicial oversight.[47]
But critical journalism was not spared the state’s wrath. Police arrested, detained or held hostage 15 Kenyan journalists, and 75 more incidents of physical violence against them were recorded in 2025.[48] The pressure continued into 2026, with violent attacks and intimidation against journalists covering the Ol Kalou by-election, including the confiscation of their equipment,[49]damage to their gears, forced deletion of footage, and obstruction.[50] Police also abducted Alex Kiprotich, associate editor of the Standard Group, in September 2026 and later abandoned him in Masinga, Machakos County, more than 200 kilometres from where they grabbed him.[51] All these attacks affected journalists critical of the regime and those covering political events. Similar observations were made by the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) through its 2026 State of Media Freedom report.[52] Even though the country’s ranking on the World Press Freedom Index improved to 106 from 117th position, out of 180 countries, there are still political, economic, legal and security pressures on journalism.[53]
The coercive environment also spread to civic organisations, actors and public-interest campaigns. State-hired goons disrupted a June 2026 civil society meeting on public finance accountability at All Saints Cathedral, assaulted participants and stole phones and bags.[54] Just this July, TISA Executive Director Diana Gichengo experienced overt state-led surveillance, road harassment and an attempted entry into TISA offices by at least 13 security officers travelling in four Subarus.[55]
Grand corruption, punitive taxation, odious debt and cost of living
Kenyans continued to bear the cost of corruption, as well as the public borrowing that was neither transparent nor spent accountably. In September 2025, the High Court overturned the decision by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) to withdraw corruption charges against former Wycliffe Oparanya, the CS for Co-operatives and MSMEs Development. The case involved allegations that more than Sh56.7 million had been received from private companies and used, in part, to acquire property in Karen, when he was the Kakamega Governor. At the time, ODPP had dropped 18 high-profile graft cases since 2017, with 15 of them in the last three years alone.[56]
In July 2026, the Court of Appeal upheld the recovery of Sh1.5 billion unlawfully paid as compensation for land occupied by Ruaraka High School and Drive Inn Primary School.[57] Public land is part of the public resource base. When it is improperly transferred or compensated, communities lose resources that could support education, health, housing, recreation, or other public needs.
But everyday corruption remained a serious challenge. Kenya scored 30 out of 100 and ranked 130th among 182 countries in Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index.[58] Locally, Transparency International Kenya’s 2025 Kenya Bribery Index found that one in four Kenyans encountered bribery while seeking public services, and 23 per cent reported that a bribe had been demanded or expected. Police were identified as the institution where respondents most frequently encountered bribery.[59] The same pattern appeared in specific corruption cases during 2026, when, for instance, Mary Ng’ethe, a former Nairobi City Council official, was ordered by the court to restitute Sh13 million in connection with the long-running Sh283 million cemetery land scandal.[60] The corruption problem unfolded alongside a growing debt burden and limited fiscal space. The World Bank reported in November 2025 that Kenya’s public debt had reached 68.8 per cent of GDP and classified the country as being at high risk of debt distress. The FY2024-25 fiscal deficit had widened to 5.9 per cent of GDP against a 4.3 per cent target.[61] By 2026, the World Bank was reporting public debt at about 70.6 per cent of GDP and said roughly one-third of government revenue was being absorbed by payment of interest.[62] Parliament approved the 2026-27 budget of about Sh4.82 trillion, with the fiscal framework projecting revenue of Sh3.63 trillion against expenditure of about Sh4.79 trillion, leaving a deficit of roughly Sh1.11 trillion.
There are legitimate concerns that borrowed money has not always been used for the intended project, yet the bulk of the revenue collected through punitive taxes goes toward repaying the same loans. The human rights implication is that for every shilling committed to servicing debt, a shilling cannot be spent elsewhere. This has been further compounded by the fact that, as of September 30, 2025, county governments had accumulated Sh177.5 billion in pending accruals, comprising Sh125.7 billion in recurrent expenditure and Sh51.8 billion in development expenditure,[63] raising concerns about whether many counties could settle the liabilities without affecting service delivery. This constrains the regime’s ability to progressively realise rights, particularly in the areas of health, education, food, housing, social protection, and other economic and social rights. This explains why KNCHR found that of the 2,848 complaints it received, 1,381 concerned economic, social and cultural rights, compared with 1,171 involving civil and political rights. KNCHR linked unmet rights in health, food, education, housing, and social protection to growing public frustration and youth agitation.[64]
Education and health are becoming less affordable
The constitution, under Article 43, guarantees every person the right to the highest attainable standard of health, including health care services, and the right to education. However, during the reporting period, mounting evidence showed that the ability to exercise these rights increasingly depends on households’ ability to absorb costs that public systems are meant to cover.
In September 2026, the Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU) presented demands for improved salaries and allowances, research funding, promotions and changes to the retirement age as part of the proposed 2025–2029 collective bargaining agreement.[65] Persistent disputes over these issues have often disrupted learning and undermined the quality and accessibility of public higher education. On the other hand, the Elimu Bora Working Group (EBWG) found that 64.9 per cent of learners in day schools were sent home or denied access to class because of unpaid illegal levies, compared with 40.5 per cent in boarding schools. EBWG also found that illegal charges ranged from about Sh15,000 to Sh20,000 in day schools and up to Sh60,000 in boarding schools.[66] The situation is compounded when public education financing itself is inadequate or delayed, and the problem is particularly severe for poorer households, for whom relatively small payments can determine whether a child remains in class.
Similar concerns have emerged in the health sector. A parliamentary assessment of the Social Health Authority’s (SHA) utilisation of funds at 10 health facilities identified systemic problems in the authority's implementation, including delayed and withheld reimbursements. Some facilities went months without receiving reimbursements, and the approved but unpaid claims were putting additional pressure on hospitals.[67] By April 2026, the Controller of Budget's findings showed that county public hospitals were owed more than Sh8 billion in unpaid SHA claims. Kisumu County alone was owed about Sh1.87 billion, followed by Nyeri, Nakuru and Kiambu.[68] Delayed reimbursements undermined public hospitals’ ability to operate effectively, resulting in a lack of access to proper medical care for citizens, as expected under Article 43.
Questions about SHA also extended to the way households are assessed for contributions. An investigation by Africa Uncensored examined the authority’s use of a proxy means-testing system to determine what households should contribute and found that the system was unable to accurately identify household income and affordability, particularly among poorer households.[69] A subsequent investigation reported by The Guardian, drawing on the work of Africa Uncensored and Lighthouse, found evidence that the SHA means-testing system could disproportionately burden poorer households and that some people had been denied treatment or faced unaffordable charges.[70] This violates the constitutional principles on the demand for citizens to receive the highest attainable standard of health.
Land and natural resources justice
Land, climate, and natural resources became increasingly important human rights issues during the reporting period. Across Turkana, Kakamega, and Lamu, disputes over land, oil, gold, and large infrastructure projects showed how community ownership, compensation, environmental protection, public participation, and benefit-sharing were undermined. In January 2026, UN special procedures raised concerns about human rights violations associated with fossil fuel extraction in the Lokichar Basin in Turkana following the transition from Tullow Oil to Gulf Energy. The extraction by Tullow and, subsequently, Gulf Energy had proceeded without the free, prior and informed consent of Turkana indigenous peoples, with implications for indigenous rights, land, health, the environment and human rights defenders.[71] The issue reached the courts when Turkana Indigenous People Action for Development challenged the handling of community land and Sh258 million, which the Turkana County received from Tullow in connection with a lease over community land. The money should have been transferred to the relevant community land-management structures, but it was not.[72]
Still, the proposed Shanta Gold mining projects in Kakamega, Siaya and neighbouring areas violated communities’ rights to participate freely and safely in decisions over projects that may permanently change their land and livelihoods. On December 4, 2025, a public participation meeting on the proposed Ikolomani Gold Mine in Kakamega descended into chaos, with deaths, injuries and arbitrary arrests of locals. Authorities failed to protect residents exercising their right to protest the way the project was being conducted. To date, fears of forced displacement, loss of ancestral land and disruption of community livelihoods are real.[73] Residents have called for the Shanta Gold projects to be suspended until concerns over land rights, compensation and public participation are addressed. The company estimates the project’s gold resource at about 1.27 million ounces, valued at roughly Sh683 billion,[74] and this could perhaps explain why, despite locals’ fightback, authorities have turned a deaf ear to their demands and to the protection of fundamental rights.
Land rights in Lamu also came to the forefront in September this year. The regime took over ancestral land occupied and used for generations by locals in Chandavai, without adequate compensation or resettlement, as it moved to groundbreak the Dangote oil refinery. This is despite the land having supported homes, farms, livestock, trees, mosques and shrines.[75] The dispute continued even as the refinery’s groundbreaking went ahead in October, puncturing procedural justice, given that the communities were not properly notified, compensated or consulted. The regime’s tactic of proceeding first and resolving rights disputes later is undermining the principles of public participation.
Additionally, the National Land Commission’s (NLC) handling of historical land injustice claims has itself become a source of concern. Communities in Murang'a had pursued claims for years, arguing that their ancestors were displaced from land now controlled by Kakuzi. NLC issued a determination in November 2025, and even though it recommended that Kakuzi surrender 3,200 acres for the settlement of vulnerable members of the affected communities[76], the commission dismissed other claims because the information submitted was “scanty”. This is even though historical land claims are, by definition, difficult to document. Many involve events that occurred during colonial rule or the early post-independence period, when communities had little access to formal records, maps, title documents or legal representation. There are concerns about whether NCL had the time, investigators, archival capacity, resources and institutional commitment necessary to independently reconstruct contested histories before reaching its conclusions.
On a positive note, however, the regime moved to strengthen environmental safeguards in the mining sector, after, in April 2026, it announced it was enforcing the Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Deposit Bonds) Regulations, 2025, requiring licensed mining companies to provide financial guarantees for rehabilitation and restoration of degraded mining sites.[77] Such safeguards are important because the costs of environmental restoration should never be borne by communities or the public when private extraction closes.
Independent institutions as the last line of defence
The capture and weakening of oversight institutions, ranging from parliament to constitutional commissions and independent offices, is why the above issues have deepened and left people extremely exposed. Courts, constitutional commissions, independent offices and oversight bodies are the cogs that run the engine. Article 249 of the Constitution gives commissions and independent offices the objects of protecting the sovereignty of the people, securing democratic values and principles and promoting constitutionalism. It also requires them to operate independently and without direction or control from another person or authority. The courts continued to check executive overreach through the cases they decided, some of which are highlighted in this report. However, the judiciary itself faced pressure over resources and accountability. Its own 2024-25 annual report identified inadequate funding and security concerns, including intrusions into court premises and physical attacks on judiciary staff.[78] In September 2026, the Judiciary was still fighting for adequate funding to handle the disputes likely to arise from the general election.[79]
Parliament is constitutionally meant to be a check on executive power. However, during the reporting period, its ability to perform that role was weakened by the Executive’s ability to command a working majority. This dynamic has been consequential, as MPs failed to effectively scrutinise taxation, public expenditure, borrowing, and the conduct of state agencies. There has also been little to no accountability. Kenyan authorities failed to investigate or prosecute security forces in most cases of excessive or lethal force during protests from 2023 to 2026. IPOA, for instance, had registered 60 killings linked to the 2024 protests, but, as of April 2025, had completed only 22 investigations and charged two cases in court.[80] Kenya has constitutional institutions designed to prevent precisely this slide. All independent bodies must be able to act without political interference.
10 irreducible demands and the institutions responsible for accountability
The state must immediately:
- End police killings, torture, enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests; protect the right to peaceful assembly and protests; and hold perpetrators accountable. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) must investigate deaths, serious injuries and other violations arising from police operations and ensure that cases warranting prosecution are referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP). The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) must independently monitor police conduct and document violations of constitutional rights. The National Police Service Commission (NPSC) must take appropriate disciplinary action against officers found culpable, while the ODPP must prosecute criminal offences and the courts must ensure justice and effective remedies for victims.
- Protect journalists, human rights defenders, civil society organisations and opposition actors. The KNCHR must monitor violations, investigate human rights concerns within its mandate and hold the state accountable for attacks and intimidation targeting these groups. The Media Council of Kenya (MCK) must defend media freedom and the safety and independence of journalists. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) must address hate speech, discrimination and incitement, while the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) must enforce political parties' obligations under the law and their code of conduct. IPOA must investigate police involvement in or failure to prevent abuses against these groups.
- Protect digital rights and prevent cybercrime laws and surveillance from being weaponised. The Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC) must enforce data protection laws and investigate unlawful processing of personal data and breaches of privacy. The KNCHR must monitor the human rights implications of digital surveillance and restrictions on online expression. The Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) must exercise its regulatory and oversight mandate in the telecommunications sector, while the courts must scrutinise unlawful surveillance, arbitrary restrictions on digital expression and the unconstitutional application of cybercrime laws.
- Ensure free, fair and credible electoral preparations. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) must take the lead in ensuring credible electoral preparations, protecting the integrity of electoral processes and enforcing electoral laws within its mandate. The KNCHR must monitor electoral-related human rights violations, and the IPOA and the NPSC must ensure accountability for police misconduct during the electoral period.
- Prevent political intolerance, violence and the use of goons. The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) must hold political parties accountable for violence, intimidation and the conduct of their members, officials and supporters under the Political Parties Act and its code of conduct. The NCIC must address ethnic mobilisation, hate speech and incitement that fuel political violence. The IEBC must enforce electoral laws and codes of conduct within its jurisdiction. The ODPP must prosecute perpetrators.
- End grand corruption and abuse of public office. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) must investigate corruption, economic crimes and abuse of public office and pursue recovery of public assets obtained unlawfully. The Auditor-General must expose irregularities and misuse of public resources through independent audits. The ODPP must prosecute corruption cases, while the courts must ensure timely determination of cases and appropriate orders for recovery and restitution.
- Account for all local and foreign debts incurred and taxes collected. The Auditor-General must independently audit public debt, government borrowing and the use of public funds, while the Controller of Budget must monitor budget implementation and expenditure by national and county governments. The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) must provide oversight through its mandate on equitable revenue sharing and recommendations on public financial management. The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) must account for tax collection and administration. Parliament must scrutinise public borrowing, taxation and expenditure, and demand accountability from the Executive. The EACC must investigate any corruption or misappropriation identified in the management of public finances.
- Safeguard the rights to affordable, accessible and quality education and health for all. The KNCHR must monitor violations of economic and social rights and hold the state accountable for failure to meet its constitutional obligations. The Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ) must investigate complaints of maladministration, unfair treatment and failures in public service delivery. The Auditor-General must audit expenditure allocated to education and health, while the Controller of Budget must monitor the release and utilisation of funds for these essential services.
- Protect land, environmental and community rights. The National Land Commission (NLC) must address historical land injustices, oversee public land management and promote accountability in land administration. The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) must enforce environmental laws and safeguards, including compliance with environmental impact assessment requirements. The KNCHR must monitor violations of community rights, including forced displacement, inadequate compensation, exclusion from decision-making and abuses linked to natural resource extraction. The courts must provide effective remedies where land, environmental and community rights are violated.
- Strengthen independent institutions and guarantee remedies and reparations. Executive encroachment must stop, and any interference with recruitment must cease forthwith. These institutions must have structural independence and financial autonomy. The KNCHR must monitor threats to constitutionalism and the independence of oversight institutions, while the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) must safeguard the independence of the Judiciary and the integrity of judicial appointments. The Public Service Commission (PSC) and the NPSC must protect merit-based recruitment and exercise their respective constitutional mandates without political interference. Each independent commission and constitutional office must defend its institutional independence and resist unlawful direction or control. Parliament must allocate adequate funding to these institutions, consistent with Article 249 of the Constitution, and ensure their budgets remain separate votes. The Auditor-General must independently audit public resources allocated to them. Where executive interference, unlawful appointments or violations of institutional independence occur, the courts must provide appropriate constitutional remedies.
[1] https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2026
[2] https://monitor.civicus.org/globalfindings_2025/africa/
[3] https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/report-kenya/
[4] https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/international-lessons-democratic-backsliding-and-recovery
[5] https://protectdemocracy.org/work/the-authoritarian-playbook/
[6] https://khrc.or.ke/press-release/rutos-3-years-of-violence-corruption-and-state-capture/
[7] https://nation.africa/kenya/news/tifa-poll-76pc-of-kenyans-believe-country-is-moving-in-wrong-direction-5589412
[8] https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Kenya-Country-Analysis-Electoral-Vulnerability-Index-2026-2027.pdf
[9] https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/83anuUbnPw.pdf
[10] https://www.knchr.org/Articles/ArtMID/2432/ArticleID/1239/Preliminary-Statement-on-Human-Rights-Concerns-during-the-27th-November-2025-By-Elections
[11] https://x.com/elogkenya/status/2028071133560385641?s=20
[12] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/rift-valley/article/2001547817/three-injured-as-rival-supporters-clash-as-emurua-dikirr-heads-to-polls
[13] https://www.article19.org/resources/kenya-justice-for-journalists-attacked-while-covering-by-election/
[14] https://www.knchr.org/Articles/ArtMID/2432/ArticleID/1259/KNCHR-CONDEMNS-ESCALATING-POLITICAL-VIOLENCE-AND-ELECTORAL-MALPRACTICES-DURING-THE-OL-KALOU-CONSTITUENCY-BY-ELECTION-CAMPAIGNS
[15] Ibid 1
[16] https://beta.nation.co.ke/kenya/news/mapped-kenya-election-chaos-hotspots--5608992?utm_source=chatgpt.com#story
[17] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001539363/police-probe-chaos-during-church-service-attended-by-gachuagua-in-othaya
[18] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001541039/kitengela-rally-death-family-cries-for-justice-after-young-father-shot
[19] https://citizen.digital/article/one-person-killed-in-clash-between-linda-mwananchi-govt-supporters-in-mbale-n377895
[20] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001545074/senator-osotsi-attack-exposes-rising-political-goonism-fears
[21] https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/09/11/kenya-organized-gang-attacks-in-lead-up-to-elections
[22] https://youtu.be/Rs61SbDg7ks?si=k_lkK-Bz876qN4Ul
[23] https://www.amnestykenya.org/victims-of-violent-policing-need-our-singular-focus/
[24] https://www.amnestykenya.org/october-mid-november-2025-issue-of-the-amnesty-kenya-gazette/
[25] https://srdefenders.org/kenya-arrest-detention-deportation-and-prosecution-of-human-rights-defenders-as-part-of-wider-crackdown-on-peaceful-protests-joint-communication/
[26] https://missingvoices.or.ke/node/1611
[27] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/amp/national/article/2001545994/fuel-hike-court-frees-10-protesters-on-sh3000-cash-bail
[28] https://www.missingvoices.or.ke/article/police-killings-spike-may-making-it-kenyas-deadliest-month-so-far-2026-1675
[29] https://apnews.com/article/kenya-fuel-prices-protests-0195168fd0507d2b4800acbe43feb5a6
[30] https://x.com/VOCALAfrica_/status/2113912065152700925?a=Dj0CCbARuhE0fKnqtmU&s=20
[31] https://www.amnestykenya.org/odipodev-and-aik-release-the-freedom-index-half-year-2026-report-exposing-rising-protests-in-kenya-and-continued-use-of-lethal-force-and-deepening-rights-crisis/
[32] https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/kenya-police-fire-tear-gas-arrest-ex-chief-justice-national-park-protest-2026-06-08/
[33] https://youtu.be/3B07TpvTA08?si=k3tGm4nkUcZ4UTw5
[34] https://www.knchr.org/Articles/ArtMID/2432/ArticleID/1258/Enforced-Disappearances-Torture-and-other-Human-Rights-Violations-following-the-25th-June-2026-Protests-Marking-the-2nd-Anniversary-of-the-2024-Gen-Z-Protests
[35] https://www.article19.org/resources/kenya-calls-for-justice-as-assaults-on-rights-escalate/
[36] https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/updates/2026/07/cgfoe-protest-monitor-july-2-2026-issue-kenya/
[37] https://khrc.or.ke/press-release/khrc-condemns-illegal-rendition-of-kagoro-warns-of-escalating-crackdown-on-rights-defenders/page/66/
[38] https://youtu.be/DViU6fZf8jI?si=pUcFf9vxxe6DJHuZ
[39] https://achpr.au.int/sw/node/4541
[40] https://freedomhouse.org/uk/node/8249
[41] https://www.article19.org/resources/kenya-release-and-cease-attacks-on-government-critics/
[42] https://citizen.digital/article/suluhu-wants-rutos-help-to-discipline-gen-zs-agitating-for-good-governance-n382085
[43] https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression
[44] Ibid 2
[45] https://khrc.or.ke/press-release/rutos-digital-intelligence-unit-will-increase-mass-surveillance-abuses/
[46] https://khrc.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/shabibi-2026-telecoms.pdf
[47] https://icj-kenya.org/news/for-immediate-release-court-strikes-down-unconstitutional-provisions-ofkenyas-cybercrimes-amendment-act/
[48] https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/medias/file/2026/03/RSF%20Report%20-%20What%20it%27s%20like%20to%20be%20a%20journalist%20in%20Africa%E2%80%99s%20Great%20Lakes%20region_0.pdf
[49] Ibid 3
[50] https://www.amnestykenya.org/end-attacks-on-journalists-covering-political-events-in-kenya/
[51] https://www.amnestykenya.org/abduction-of-journalist-alex-kiprotich-threatens-freedom-of-expression-and-media-freedom/
[52]https://mediacouncil.or.ke/sites/default/files/downloads/STATE%20OF%20MEDIA%20FREEDOM%20IN%20KENYA%202026%20%281%29.pdf
[53] https://rsf.org/en/country/kenya
[54] https://x.com/thekhrc/status/2065394972753322278?s=20
[55] https://khrc.or.ke/press-release/grave-concerns-over-continued-intimidation-harassment-and-attacks-against-the-civic-space-in-kenya/page/65/
[56] https://eacc.go.ke/en/default/odpp-faulted-as-court-revives-oparanya-case/
[57] https://eacc.go.ke/en/default/court-of-appeal-paves-way-for-eacc-to-recover-kes1-5-billion-in-ruaraka-land-case/
[58] https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kenya
[59] https://tikenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Kenya-Bribery-Index-2025.pdf
[60] https://eacc.go.ke/en/default/eacc-recovers-kes13-million-from-former-nairobi-city-council-official-in-cemetery-land-scandal/
[61] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/11/24/kenya-shows-economic-resilience-sustained-progress-depends-on-procompetitive-reforms
[62] https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/kenya
[63] https://cob.go.ke/publications/consolidated-county-budget-implementation-review-reports/
[64] https://www.knchr.org/Articles/ArtMID/2432/ArticleID/1240/STATE-OF-HUMAN-RIGHTS-IN-KENYA-DEC-2024-DEC-2025-CHAIRPERSON%E2%80%99S-ADDRESS
[65] https://nation.africa/kenya/news/education/what-varsity-lecturers-want-in-new-cba-5608174#story
[66] https://x.com/thekhrc/status/2107507190328147995?s=20
[67] https://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2025-12/Report%20of%20DC%20Health%20on%20the%20assessment%20of%20Social%20Health%20Authority%20%28SHA%29%20utilization%20of%20funds%20disbursed%20since%20inception%20and%20challenges%20faced%20by%20facilities.pdf
[68] https://beta.nation.co.ke/kenya/health/hospitals-in-intensive-care-as-sha-owes-sh8-billion-5434098
[69] https://sha.africauncensored.online/
[70] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/may/04/kenya-ai-healthcare-reforms-driving-up-costs-for-poor
[71] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/RelCom?code=KEN+4%2F2025&utm_s
[72] https://sheriahub.com/cases/ke/caselaw/turkana-indigenous-people-action-for-development-tipd-v-turkana-county-government-5-others-2026-keelc-2971-klr
[73] https://khrc.or.ke/press-release/khrc-decries-state-and-corporate-violence-in-mining-zones-including-shanta-golds-activities-in-kakamega-siaya-and-vihiga-counties/
[74] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/western/article/2001551875/sh683b-gold-project-faces-senate-scrutiny-over-land-dispute/
[75] https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2026-09-28-residents-sue-to-halt-dangotes-sh2tr-lamu-refinery/
[76] https://landcommission.go.ke/hli-determinations
[77] https://www.kenyanews.go.ke/state-banks-on-environmental-deposit-bonds-to-guarantee-mining-site-restoration/
[78] https://judiciary.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/SOJAR-2024-2025-Final-Dec-12.pdf
[79] https://judiciary.go.ke/judiciary-seeks-adequate-funding-ahead-of-2027-general-elections/
[80] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/kenya
