KHRC Executive Director Atsango Chesoni encourages Kenyans to monitor this process keenly. “We urge all citizens to seize this opportunity and make recommendations as to how we can move forward on the important human rights questions of our time,” she says.

The aim of the UPR process is to improve the human rights situation within a given country. It is hoped that the process will result in commitments by the Kenyan government to improve the human rights situation in the country. This will be Kenya’s second review having first undergone the process in April 2010.

KHRC is a premier and flagship non-governmental human rights and governance institution in Africa that was founded in 1991 with a vision to Securing Human Rights States and Societies.

 Media bookings contact:

Audrey Wabwire/Communications Manager/  Email: awabwire@khrc.or.ke

The Bill seeks to amend the following Laws;
Public Order Act (Cap 56), Extradition (continuous and foreign countries) Act (Cap 76), Penal Code (Cap 63), Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 75), Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012), Sexual Offenses Act (2006), Registration of Persons Act (Cap 107), Evidence Act (Cap 80), Prisons Act (Cap 90), Firearms Act (Cap 114), Radiation protection Act (Cap 243), Rent Restriction Act (Cap 296), Kenya Airport Authority Act (Cap 395), Traffic Act (Cap 403), Investment Promotion Act (Cap 485), Labour Institutions Act (2012), National Transport Safety Authority Act (2012), Refugee Act (2006), National Intelligence Service Act (2012), Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (2011), National Police Service Act (2011) and Civil Aviation Act (2013),Public Benefits Organizations Act,2013. The bill once enacted as it is will have an impact on many more laws.

In exercise of our respective mandates we bring to the attention of the public the under-listed summary of our concerns, our detailed submissions will be made available on our respective websites.

1. PROCESS: We are concerned that contrary to the express provisions of Article 118(b) Parliament has not facilitated meaningful and effective engagement of the public with the Bill. The Bill was published on 10^th December and was not made easily accessible. The tight timelines given by the Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security for making submissions combined with the difficulty in accessing the Bill limited public participation in the process. The proposed changes are not minor. They are momentous and seek to amend the Bill of Rights through the back door. Accordingly, any changes to the Bill of Rights require a referendum as per Article 255. The proposed Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014 makes major amendments to at least 22 laws and impact on several others including the laws relating to County Governments.

2. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NUMBER OF THE PROVISIONS. We are concerned that a number of the
provisions are in conflict with the provisions of the constitution or will in implementation result in a limitation of the rights provided for in the constitution. Article 238 of the Constitution provides that National Security shall be promoted and guaranteed subject to the authority of the constitution and parliament and further, that the national security shall be pursued in compliance with the law and utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. This is an absolute requirement and not subject to the exercise of discretion.

Freedom of Assembly and Association: Clause 4 proposes to amend the Public Order Act so as to give powers to the Cabinet Secretary to designate areas where and times at which public gatherings or public processions may be held. This contravenes Articles 10, 36,37 and 119 of the Constitution. The Limitations have the effect of negating the essence of the right. The current law that requires that an individual in notifying the authority give details of the purpose, date, duration, location and route of the procession are adequate. It is not clear how the proposed amendment to the Public Benefit Organisations Act will address the security challenges. The proposed amendment signifies an intention to maintain control over these organisations.

Freedom of Expression and Information: Clause 15 amends the penal code to create the offence of publishing or causing to be published or distributed obscene, gory or offensive material which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the general public or disturb public peace. The offence created is a felony and if committed by an individual the penalty is a fine not exceeding 1 million and imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years. If committed by a media enterprise a fine not exceeding 5 million shillings. Whereas the import of these provisions is clear when applied to communication by extremist and terrorist groups, the section does not seem to make exception for the role media and other actors play in sharing information and social commentaries on current issues. As framed the clause is an infringement on the right to expression and information. The existing media regulatory framework can adequately address the concerns of responsible journalism.

• • The immediate withdrawal of the said bill from parliament.
  • The separation of major from minor amendments proposed in the Bill.
  • Compliance with values and principles stipulated under Article 10 and 118 of the Constitution on public participation.
  • The subsequent bill or bills should therefore be made accessible in a simple language to Kenyans with reasonable timelines to allow public participation.
  • That any amendment proposed on any provision in the Bills of Rights should be subjected to a referendum in line with the Constitution

Signed:
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ARTICLE 19, Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO), Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya (GALCK) Human Rights Watch, Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), Katiba Institute, Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), Legal Resources Foundation, National Coalition for Human Rights Defenders-Kenya (NCHRD-K) and UHAI-EASHRI, The Federation of Women Lawyers – Kenya, Haki Focus

Towards this, the KHRC has been involved in the campaigns for reforms and justice processes in Kenya and beyond. These initiatives have realized many gains and faced a number of pitfalls. The latest challenge relates with the on-going attempts by the state to undermine the constitutional and democratic gains realized after many years of struggles and sacrifices.

Some of the key indicators of the retrogressive developments includes but are not limited to: the campaign to discredit and undermine the operations of the both the independent state offices and non-state actors(especially media, trade unions and civil society organizations) through threats, hate messages, repugnant legal and administrative systems among others.

Last week, the Government of Kenya (GoK) published the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill that purport to provide a panacea for the current gaps in security governance. KHRC and in partnership with the other human rights organizations have declared the Bill unconstitutional for both the process and contents are inimical to human rights and other governance principles and systems enshrined in the Supreme Law of the land and the regional and international human rights frameworks.

Yesterday, the government through the NGO Coordination Board(NCB) deregistered 501 NGOs and gave twelve international NGOs of good standing and with an annual income of more than Ksh. 500 million twenty one days to account for their finances failure to which they will be shut down. Moreover, fifteen NGOs, based mainly in Northern Kenya and the Coast Regions were accused of funding terrorism were banned.

The KHRC wish to raise five Constitutional questions in respect of the due diligence considerations by the NGO Board in making the far reaching decision:

• To what extend was the NGO Council, the sector coordination mechanism and other stakeholders consulted and involved in the decision making process? Public and stakeholder consultation is a fundamental principles enshrined in Article 10 of the Constitution.
• To what extend were the affected 501 NGOs contacted and given adequate notice for compliance. What are the opportunities for appealing against these decisions?
• What are the considerations in the decision making process-failure to account or support of terrorism or both? Was the decision based on fair processes and considerations, pursuant to Article 47 of the Constitution which guarantees a right to fair administrative action that entails expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair?
• What is the logical congruence between the so called “having humongous amounts of money” in NGOs accounts and funding terrorism? This postulation sounds selective, spurious and a gross affront on the right to equality and freedom from discrimination enshrined in Article 27 of the Constitution.
• How comes this decision coincides with current context where by the civil society and other independent actors and stakeholders are involved in the campaign against the repugnant Security (Amendment) Bill?

This decision coincides with the government’s strategy to shrink the civic space and silence the operations of NGOs and other independent voices in Kenya. It is a ploy to unconstitutionally limit such fundamental rights as the freedoms of conscience, belief, opinion, expression and association.

We wish to state that: We strongly believe in transparency, accountability, integrity and other principles entrenched in the Constitution of Kenya- both in our operations and engagements at all levels, in the society. Moreover, we believe that security if a fundamental right without which other rights cannot be released.

However, while we appreciate the state’s interventions geared towards securing the country and enhancing accountability for state and non-state actors, we declare that these must be executed within the established constitutional and legal frameworks. Any limitation should be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based solely on human dignity, equality and freedom.

Davis M Malombe

Deputy Executive Director     

Towards this, the KHRC has been involved in the campaigns for reforms and justice processes in Kenya and beyond. These initiatives have realized many gains and faced a number of pitfalls. The latest challenge relates with the on-going attempts by the state to undermine the constitutional and democratic gains realized after many years of struggles and sacrifices.

Some of the key indicators of the retrogressive developments includes but are not limited to: the campaign to discredit and undermine the operations of the both the independent state offices and non-state actors(especially media, trade unions and civil society organizations) through threats, hate messages, repugnant legal and administrative systems among others.

Last week, the Government of Kenya (GoK) published the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill that purport to provide a panacea for the current gaps in security governance. KHRC and in partnership with the other human rights organizations have declared the Bill unconstitutional for both the process and contents are inimical to human rights and other governance principles and systems enshrined in the Supreme Law of the land and the regional and international human rights frameworks.

Yesterday, the government through the NGO Coordination Board(NCB) deregistered 501 NGOs and gave twelve international NGOs of good standing and with an annual income of more than Ksh. 500 million twenty one days to account for their finances failure to which they will be shut down. Moreover, fifteen NGOs, based mainly in Northern Kenya and the Coast Regions were accused of funding terrorism were banned.

The KHRC wish to raise five Constitutional questions in respect of the due diligence considerations by the NGO Board in making the far reaching decision:

• To what extend was the NGO Council, the sector coordination mechanism and other stakeholders consulted and involved in the decision making process? Public and stakeholder consultation is a fundamental principles enshrined in Article 10 of the Constitution.
• To what extend were the affected 501 NGOs contacted and given adequate notice for compliance. What are the opportunities for appealing against these decisions?
• What are the considerations in the decision making process-failure to account or support of terrorism or both? Was the decision based on fair processes and considerations, pursuant to Article 47 of the Constitution which guarantees a right to fair administrative action that entails expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair?
• What is the logical congruence between the so called “having humongous amounts of money” in NGOs accounts and funding terrorism? This postulation sounds selective, spurious and a gross affront on the right to equality and freedom from discrimination enshrined in Article 27 of the Constitution.
• How comes this decision coincides with current context where by the civil society and other independent actors and stakeholders are involved in the campaign against the repugnant Security (Amendment) Bill?

This decision coincides with the government’s strategy to shrink the civic space and silence the operations of NGOs and other independent voices in Kenya. It is a ploy to unconstitutionally limit such fundamental rights as the freedoms of conscience, belief, opinion, expression and association.

We wish to state that: We strongly believe in transparency, accountability, integrity and other principles entrenched in the Constitution of Kenya- both in our operations and engagements at all levels, in the society. Moreover, we believe that security if a fundamental right without which other rights cannot be released.

However, while we appreciate the state’s interventions geared towards securing the country and enhancing accountability for state and non-state actors, we declare that these must be executed within the established constitutional and legal frameworks. Any limitation should be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based solely on human dignity, equality and freedom.

Davis M Malombe

Deputy Executive Director     

The objectives of the forum were i) to share with relevant institutions, the observations, findings and recommendations from recent by-elections; ii) to discuss, enrich and commence preparations on the adoption of recommendations aimed at improving the management and administration of upcoming elections and iii) to develop a road map of required administrative and legal reforms within the current electoral cycle.

The forum saw over 40 representatives from civil society organizations, the Judiciary, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, National Police Service, Political Parties Disputes Tribunal, the National Registration Bureau and Political Parties attend and participate in the electoral discourse. Notably, Ms. Lilian Mahiri-Zaja (Vice Chairperson, IEBC), Ms. Lucy Ndungú (Registrar of political parties), Mr. Mohamed Alawi (Commissioner, IEBC), Ms. Grace Maingi (Executive Director, Uraia Trust), Mr. Justice Luka Kimaru (Judge, High Court), Mrs. Susan Mwongera (CEO, Youth Agenda), Ms. Tryphaena Estambale ( CEO, Political Parties Dispute Tribunal), Ms. Anne Nderitu ( Director, Voter education and Partnerships, IEBC), Ms. Immaculate Kassait (Director, Voter Registration and Electoral Operation, IEBC) graced the Forum.

The forum entailed presentations by key experts followed by plenary discussions. To this end, Mr. Oloo led a presentation and a discussion on the gaps in the electoral legislation and the role the courts play in the electoral process while highlighting the importance of dispute resolution mechanisms and electoral jurisprudence emanating from the supreme court; Mr. Mike Yard – the Chief of Party-IFES, highlighted the issue of technology in elections with a focus on what technology can and can’t do during elections; Ms. Grace Maingi, underscored strategies on the implementation of the 2/3 gender rule; Ms. Lucy Ndungú highlighted and reiterated the role political parties play in elections with a focus on the challenges political parties faced during the 2013 general elections as well as the way forward; Ms. Carol Werunga of KHRC, underscored the human rights perspective in elections with a focus on the political participation of persons with disabilities; and Ms. Susan Mwongera highlighted the challenges youth faced during the 2013 electioneering period. Lastly, IEBC was able to share their strategies that will see them deal with the challenges around voter registration, party lists, nominations, dispute resolution, the participation of special interest groups in electoral processes, voter education and the use of technology in the electoral process.

As a result of the forum, a comprehensive report, highlighting, among other things, a road map that identifies key issues, strategies, timelines and responsibilities is being developed and will be shared with all participants for validation before being shared with other stakeholders.

Should the police “shoot to kill” suspected criminals to counter the high security threats in the country?

In the face of increased insecurity in the country over the recent months resulting in loss of many innocent lives, physical and emotional trauma among other impacts, the National Police Service (NPS) has devised strategies to combat crime. Whereas most of these strategies are lawful and acceptable, our attention has been drawn to directives issued by senior police officers ordering police officers to ‘shoot-to-kill’ suspected criminals. Appreciating the challenging task facing our security forces in guaranteeing security in the face of violent criminality especially terror-related and other related crimes police will inevitably be required to use force on occasion, and sometimes lethal force in order to protect life.

It is however important for police officers in particular and Kenyans in general to understand the circumstances under which a police officer is legally allowed to use force and firearms (lethal) in executing his/her duty.

When should police officers use lethal force or firearms while combating crime?

Section 1 Part A of the Sixth Schedule of the National Police Service Act 2011 sets out the rules and procedures on use of force and firearms by police officers. The schedule states that:

1. A police officer shall always attempt to use non-violent means first and lethal force may only be employed when non-violent means are ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result

1. The force used shall be proportional to the objective to be achieved, the seriousness of the offence, and the resistance of the person against whom it is used, and only to the extent necessary while adhering to the provisions of the law and the Standing Orders.

1. Firearms or lethal force may only be used when less extreme means are inadequate and for the following purposes—

ü Saving or protecting the life of the officer or other person; and

ü In self-defense or in defence of other person against imminent threat of life or serious injury.

1. An officer intending to use firearms shall identify themselves and give clear warning of their intention to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, except;

ü where doing so would place the officer or other person at risk of death or serious harm; or

ü If it would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances

1. A police officer shall make every effort to avoid the use of firearms, especially against children.

Note: Any use of firearms outside the ambit of the instances provided above amounts to unlawful use of firearms and in case of deaths, extrajudicial executions.

WHAT IS AN EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION?

Extra-Judicial Executions are planned executions committed by governments or government-backed agents with a total lack of regard for due process of law and/or judicial procedure as protected in the law. Kenya is a party to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. International law prohibits the “arbitrary deprivation of life”, and obligates governments to both “respect and ensure” the right to life.

Article 238(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, states that national security shall be promoted and guaranteed in accordance with the principle of compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. In common parlance the police while implementing their mandate should uphold the principles set under the bill of rights where the right to life is protected under article 26(2) that states that a person shall not be deprived of the right to life intentionally, except to the extent authorized by this constitution or other written law 

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE SHOOT TO KILL ORDERS?

Killing of innocent people: The laws of Kenya assert that a person is innocent until proven guilty by a court of law. Any shoot to kill order would undermine this presumption and most critically may result in the killings of innocent persons as has been evidenced and documented variously in reports and courts judgments.

Proliferation of more militarized criminal gangs: Responding to crime and insecurity by using force would most likely see the proliferation of more militarized criminal gangs, increased gang wars and infiltration of more sophisticated illegal arms in the country. This is because such action would alienate and threaten public relations and hence a reluctance by members to share crucial information they may be having. Further the gangs would employ retaliation tactics as common in a state where the rule of law is violated.

Police officers individual liability: Police officers who follow directives on use of force not in line with the abovementioned provisions shall face individual disciplinary action or prosecution for unlawful use of force where it amounts to a criminal offence despite the fact that they were acting pursuant to a purported superior order.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO IN CASE YOU ARE A WITNESS TO EXTRA JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS?

You are legally and morally obligated for the sake of the victims, community and the betterment of policing, to make a statement to the following institutions with clear details about the incident covering noting that this information will be upheld in utmost confidentiality:

• The date and the time ofthe incident
• The police service number of the officer(s) if displayed, name if known, gender etc
• In case of a vehicle, the registration number and any other details on the vehicle
• Witnesses to the incident if any
• Any other details.

ALL INFORMATION RECEIVED WILL BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL.

Mr. President,

As you are well aware, it has been one year since terrorists attacked and mercilessly took away the lives of at least sixty seven (67) persons during the Westgate Mall terror attack. It is four and half months since criminal gangs unleashed untold terror on thousands of Kenyans and left eighty (80) people dead in Mpeketoni. It has been one year and five months since criminal gangs terrorized the residents of Bungoma and Busia, killing more than fifty (50) people and seriously injuring more than one hundred (100) Kenyans. It has been four months since inter-clan wars in Mandera claimed the lives of over forty three (43) people, left hundreds injured and over one hundred thousand displaced.

In the Northern and Rift regions in Kenya especially Turkana, Wajir, Mandera, Baringo insecurity soars with at least over one hundred and twenty (120) people dead, more than ninety five (95) seriously injured and not less than thirteen thousand five hundred and thirty six (13,536) left displaced since 29 June, 2013. In addition to these insecurity statistics we have more unmentioned incidents in Nairobi, Mombasa, Tana River, Eldoret among many more. Worse still is the fact that even security agents trained to protect civilians have themselves become victims of insecurity. Beyond losing people beloved to them, the survivors of the attacks -men, women, children civilians and security agents - suffer post-traumatic stress disorders and other forms of social distress.

Join The Campaign: Read more of the Petition

We wish to raise our voices to the European Union and government negotiators that:

1. We are deeply concerned about the asymmetrical nature of the EPA negotiations thus far. Studies show that EAC’s  51.3% of tariff lines/products where there is current local production will be put at risk, perhaps even damaged (1,100 tariff lines out of 2,144) as these are lines where liberalization will take place and the EU is more competitive on these lines than the EAC. Taking into account potential future production (tariff lines where there is no current production), 2,366 tariff lines will be liberalized making the possibility of having future production in these products questionable. In total, 68.8% of all tariff lines or products could be put at risk (current and future production).
2. We further express concern with regard to the delays in agreeing the European Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union and the East Africa Community (EAC). In particular, we wish to alert you to the potentially severe impact on the lives of 500,000 people dependent on the Kenyan floriculture business. Fair-trade and Kenya flower council works with large numbers of cut flower producers in Kenya, who largely supply European retailers. More than 33 out of 61 Fairtrade certified cut flower producers are Kenyan. Together, they employ over 32,000 workers. Country wide, the Kenyan Flower Council have estimated that over 500,000 people including 90,000 direct flower farm employees depend on the floriculture industry for their livelihoods. It is the second largest agricultural foreign exchange for Kenya valued at more than $250 million a year.
3. Small-scale farmers and producers are alarmed by the agricultural subsidies provided in the EU; and the weak safeguards provided for in the EPAs. The EU has rejected the discussion of its subsidies in the EPAs on the grounds that this is a WTO issue. However, we argue that the issue of subsidies has not been addressed in the WTO as  developed countries, including the EU have failed to live up to what was agreed on during the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial to eliminate export and trade distorting subsidies by 2013.
4. We further note that the programme is the most expensive scheme accounting for more than 40% of its annual budget and one of the most controversial. In 2013 the budget for direct farm payments (subsidies) and rural development-the twin “pillars” of Comprehensive Agricultural Policy–is 57.5 Billion Euros (Euros 49bn), out of a total budget of 132.8 billion euros (that is 43% of the total). Most of the CAP budget is direct payments to farmers.
5. There is ample evidence to show that agricultural subsidies in the EU have led to dumping of agricultural products with far reaching implication on Africa’s agricultural production and agro-processing.EU is spending way too much on subsidies when agriculture creates just 1.6% of EU GDP and employs only 5% of EU populations
6. We note that EAC having been in these negotiations since 2007, the European Union’s rigid and unilateral deadline to Conclude EPAs is not a desirable way in achieving the desired results. The conclusion of any Free Trade Agreement like EPA must take into account the interests and address the concerns of both parties, and not through timeframes. Therefore, we urge the EU to show necessary flexibility in the negotiations process, respecting the different levels of development of each EAC country.
7. We urge the EAC negotiators should therefore continue pushing for an extension of the Regulation 1528/2007 to such a period where the negotiations have been concluded or an alternative trade arrangement has been initiated. It should be appreciated that the difficult to conclude these talks are not only on the shoulders of EAC countries, but also due to rigidity on the side of the EU.
8. We emphasize that trade policy instruments such as export taxes are an integral part of East African industrialization since they promote value addition, protects infant industries and improves agricultural productivity. We further note that export taxes remain very critical after the discovery of oil, natural gas and other minerals. In fact, Kenya’s accession agreement to WTO does not prohibit it from imposing export taxes. We therefore seek an agreement that protects the livelihoods of millions of smallholder farmers and producers in the EAC region.
9. Civil society organizations, workers and Smallholder farmers argue that negotiators and the private sector have focused extensively on commercial interests without focusing on major aspects of labor, standards, human rights, environment and climate change as well as development as it was initially envisaged by the Cotonou Partnerships Agreement. The cost of signing EPA is much higher than the benefits. Kenya stands to lose USD 193.2 million and gain just about USD 87.1 million upon signing an EPA.
10. We therefore call upon the international trading partners to extend duty free quota free treatment to Least Developed Countries and non-Least Developed countries in Africa. If this is enacted, a country like Kenya which is in a least developed region will have the same trade regime with her Least Developed Counterparts of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania.
11. We note with concern that the tariffs that will be imposed will increase the price of cut flowers considerably. This extra cost must either be borne by producers themselves, or by European traders and major retailers. The imposition of tariffs therefore poses a high risk of trade moving away from Kenyan sourcing into countries which are retaining preferential market access into the EU, such as Ethiopia as a Least Developed Country. The imposition of tariffs is an unacceptable price for Fairtrade farmers and workers to bear. Fairtrade works to alleviate poverty through establishing fair trading relationships between European businesses and Kenyan producers. Through this relationship flower workers and their communities have seen improved healthcare, income, education, and reduced poverty. We now fear that the work of many years will be undermined.
12. We therefore ask the EU to extend the current tariff regime beyond 1 October 2014, to allow negotiations to be successfully concluded. Should agreement not be reached, we ask you to ensure that the moves to approve the Commission Regulation granting GSP preferences to Kenya are successfully concluded in time for 1 October 2014. We urge the European Commission to act with the utmost responsibility and awareness of the impact their decisions will have on the lives of hundreds of thousands of workers in Kenya’s floriculture industry, and with due regard to its high level commitments to poverty reduction”
13. We retaliate that the 1^st October deadline should not be a basis upon which the talks should be based on but on how to conclude the talks. In order to have a “win-win” outcome of negotiations, then the EU must be willing to support the development pillar that addresses supply side constraints. In addition, Special and differential treatment has to be part and parcel of the developmental EPA. We therefore urge the EU to extend the waiver with tariff preferences for Kenyan horticultural produce including flowers, beyond 1^st October until the outstanding issues between the EU and EAC are finalized.

The organizations include both African groups and international groups and have a presence in 40 African countries. The African Union (AU) Office of the Legal Counsel is convening a meeting in Nairobi on August 25 and 26, 2014, with government officials of AU member countries in East Africa to promote ratification of AU treaties. Discussions, which will take place at the Hilton Hotel, are expected to include a newly adopted protocol to extend the African Court’s jurisdiction to trials of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, while providing immunity for sitting leaders and other senior officials. The protocol to expand the authority of the African Court was adopted at the 23rd African Union summit, in Malabo in June.

“The immunity provision is a regrettable departure from the AU’s Constitutive Act, which rejects impunity under article 4,” said George Kegoro, executive director of the International Commission of Jurists Kenya. “Immunity takes away the prospect that victims can access justice at the African court when leaders commit atrocities. African states should take a clear stand opposing this immunity.”

The adopted Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is the first legal instrument to extend a regional court’s authority to criminal jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The protocol also covers 11 additional crimes and notably provides for an independent defense office

But Article 46A bis of the amendments provides immunity for sitting leaders, stating: “No charges shall be commenced or continued…against any serving African Union Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.”

The statutes of international and hybrid international-national war crimes tribunals reject exemptions on the basis of official capacity. Other international conventions, including the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of \ Genocide, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, recognize the crucial importance of accountability for serious crimes.

“Granting immunity to sitting officials is retrogressive, and risks giving leaders license to commit crimes,” and Timothy Mtambo executive director at Malawi’s Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation. “Immunity also risks encouraging those accused of the crimes to cling to their positions to avoid facing the law.”

Some African countries like Benin, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and South Africa rule out immunity for sitting officials for serious crimes under their national laws, the groups said.

This text of the group declaration was drafted by Malawi’s Center for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, with input from several African organizations and international organizations with a presence in Africa.

“Instead of retreating from important achievements to limit impunity, advance the rule of law, and promote respect for human rights, African governments should remain steadfast in supporting justice for victims of the worst crimes by rejecting immunity before\ the African Court,” said Angela Mudukuti, international criminal justice project lawyer at the Southern Africa Litigation Centre.

To read the declaration,please visit:

https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/22/call-african-states-reject-immunity-serious-crimes-african-civil-society-organisatio

To see other group initiatives by these organizations, please visit:
http://www.icj-kenya.org/index.php/media-centre/press-releases/20-press-statement/598-letter-to-the-justice-ministers-and-attorneys-general-of-the-african-on-immunity-of-heads-of-states
http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2013/11/18/salc-in-the-news-icc-africa-should-reject-free-pass-for-leaders/
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/African-civil-society-letter-to-AU-on-ICC-withdrawal-Oct-2013.pdf

For more information, please contact:
In Accra, for Media Foundation for West Africa, Sulemana Braimah (English): +233-302-242-470; or +233-244-520-243;
or sulemana@mfwa.org<mailto:sulemana@mfwa.org>

In Dakar, for Rencontre
Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, Aboubacry Mbodji (French):
+221-777-408-683; or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.%3cmailto:mbodjiaboubacry@gmail.com">mbodjiaboubacry@gmail.com<mailto:mbodjiaboubacry@gmail.com>

In Johannesburg, for Human Rights Watch, Tiseke Kasambala (English): +27-110-622-852; or +27-792-205-254;
or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.%3chttps://mail.hrw.org/owa/redir.aspx?C=62bfcf6eb34e4416a6066327f155ddaf&URL=mailto%3Akasambt%40hrw.org">kasambt@hrw.org<https://mail.hrw.org/owa/redir.aspx?C=62bfcf6eb34e4416a6066327f155ddaf&URL=mailto%3Akasambt%40hrw.org>

In Johannesburg, for Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Angela Mudukuti (English): +27-767-623-869; orAngelaM@salc.org.za<mailto:AngelaM@salc.org.za>

In Kampala, for Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (English), Penny Mbabazi Atuhaire: +256-777-753-566; This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.%3cmailto:pennymbabazi14@gmail.com">orpennymbabazi14@gmail.com<mailto:pennymbabazi14@gmail.com>

In Kampala, for Ugandan Coalition for the ICC, Patricia Bako (English): +256-785-138-755; or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.%3cmailto:ucicc2@gmail.com">ucicc2@gmail.com<mailto:ucicc2@gmail.com>

In Kigali, for Human Rights First Rwanda Association, Louis Busingye (English): +250784252917; orlouwizel@gmail.com<mailto:louwizel@gmail.com>

In Lilongwe, for Center for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, Timothy Mtambo (English): +265-992-166-191; or
This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.%3cmailto:mtambot@chrrmw.org">mtambot@chrrmw.org<mailto:mtambot@chrrmw.org>

In Nairobi, for Kenya section of the International Commission of Jurists, Stella Ndirangu (English):
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In Pretoria, for the International Crime in Africa Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Jemima
Njeri (English): +27-832-346-566; or +27-123-469-500; or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.%3chttps://mail.hrw.org/owa/redir.aspx?C=62bfcf6eb34e4416a6066327f155ddaf&URL=mailto%3Ajnjeri%40issafrica.org">jnjeri@issafrica.org<https://mail.hrw.org/owa/redir.aspx?C=62bfcf6eb34e4416a6066327f155ddaf&URL=mailto%3Ajnjeri%40issafrica.org>

The conference seeks to assess the overall performance and effectiveness of long term election observation and monitoring as a process through which an election is scrutinized and evaluated for purposes of determining its impartiality in terms of organization and administration.

Among those invited are representatives from civil society organizations involved in election observation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan and Sudan, regional observer networks such SADC-ESN and WAEON; the election
management body in Kenya (IEBC); developmental partners; EHORN secretariat; and the Kenya Human Rights Commission staff who will seek to exchange knowledge and experiences that will contribute to improving the integrity of elections through long term election observation activities.

Election observation in Africa tends to be heavily focused on procedures on polling day yet this is only one aspect of the election process. The opportunities for abuse are usually created, deliberately in the pre-election period when the voter register is prepared, political parties formed and registered, candidates nominated and campaigns carried out. On the other hand the election observation period of field presence is often too short to cover the entire process and hardly is the number of observers sufficient to ensure adequate coverage.

The main strategy proposed for dealing with this problem is to employ a system of long-term observation as opposed to short-term observation. While short-term observation covers the activities of voting, vote counting and the declaration of results, long-term observation involves observing the events that define the electoral process from the setting up of electoral management bodies, voter registration, voter education, political party registration, candidate nomination political campaigning and media issues, voting and the counting through to the swearing in of elected regimes.

Admittedly, most of the observation bodies in Africa have been struggling to operationalize the concept of long term observation. This has been exacerbated by lack of or limited resources in the post-election period. As a result, most
long term observation attempts have remained informal and limited in scope hence reduce in effectiveness. These problems can be tackled within a framework of institutionalized observation in which a universally acceptable mechanism that is bilaterally agreed upon is employed. This is what informs the need to have a regional conference aimed at engaging peer to peer to come up with a resolution on the way forward in the region.